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Law Reform and Law for the Layman: A
Challenge to Legal Education
Walter Barnett*
The December 1970 issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review carried
a thought-provoking speech on Law Reform and Legal Education
delivered by Professor Robert Keeton of Harvard before the
Southeastern Conference of the Association of American Law
Schools. Professor Keeton called for greateremphasis in law schools
on matters of law reform and discussed briefly the challenge this
emphasis may pose to the academic freedom of the university
community. These are issues to which the American law teaching
profession has devoted little attention. In the hope ofprovoking wider
discussion and action on these questions, Professor Barnett has set
down in this article ideas that go beyond Professor Keeton's, both
in their embodiment of concreteproposals and in their potentialfor
generating controversy. Although this article is addressed to the
author's colleagues in legal education, other readers should find the
subject interesting.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the current debate over academic neutrality has centered
on whether the university as an institution-the faculty and students as
a corporate body-should take formal positions on political issues, such
as the war in Vietnam. This article will address the related, but perhaps
more mundane, question whether law professors should take a more
active role in providing legal services to government and to the public
when this activity might provoke attacks on academic freedom.
Traditionally, law professors who have sought to serve society in ways
other than educating lawyers have engaged in the following five
extramural activities:' (1) The production of scholarly writings that are
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. B.A. 1954, Yale University; LL.B. 1957,
University of Texas; Diploma 1958, College of Europe (Belgium).
1. Of course, a law school's intramural role in educating persons for the legal profession
is certainly a service to the larger community, and it undoubtedly has been and will continue to
be the primary raison d'etre of the great majority of law schools. Just as obviously, this teaching
function has primary claim on the time and energy of any law faculty. Merely keeping up with
current developments in one's own special fields occupies a great deal of time, and the
interdependence of many fields of law makes it imperative for legal scholars to be widely read
even outside their own narrow specialties.
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published in the form of hornbooks and other treatises, monographs
on specialized topics, articles in law reviews, and casebooks; (2) Legal
aid to the poor;2 (3) The continuing legal education of the bar; (4)
Research and consultation services provided on request to other lawyers
and to government agencies on especially difficult legal questions,
usually for remuneration. Occasionally, however, law professors have
offered their services gratis to organizations or private clients in
important test cases, or as amici curiae; and (5) A variety of tasks too
multifarious to catalogue associated with the improvement of legal
education.3 This article will examine how this traditional conception of
a law school's extramural roles has resulted in two very important needs
of American society going virtually unmet, and what can be done to
remedy this neglect. The thesis of this article is that law professors, by
limiting themselves to these activities, have failed to help government
devise rational laws and have neglected to educate the public on the
importance of the law in their daily lives. The article examines two ways
that law professors could help American society meet these current
needs. It concludes with an evaluation of whether these proposed activities would signal a departure from the principle of academic neutrality
and therefore pose a danger to academic freedom.
II.

THE WASTELAND OF AMERICAN LAW

One would think that with over 140 accredited law schools and
2,000 law teachers-on the whole probably of the highest calibre the
world has ever seen-American law would be a model of clarity,
rationality, and justice. For the most part, it is instead a muddled,
inconsistent, irrational mess that only appears to work justice to those
who keep its machinery oiled, because they are so close to the system
that they cannot see the forest for the trees. This indictment of American
law is made on the basis of the writer's own, admittedly limited,
experience in the practice and teaching of "private" property law in
three fairly typical states-Texas, Florida, and New Mexico. Occasional
sallies into other areas of the law in these states have only confirmed
this impression. The reader is left to judge whether his own experience
warrants the same conclusion.
What are the causes of this lamentable state of the law? If the writer
had to single out any one cause as the major one, he would choose the
2. This particular service function is experiencing a great revival with the current trend
towards clinical legal education.
3. The yearly proceedings and committee activities of the AALS are examples of these tasks.
Of course, some of the activities previously outlined, like the production of teaching materials,
are also of this type.
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fact that the law teaching profession has been pointing its extramural
efforts in the wrong direction-towards a preoccupation with the law
as made by courts rather than the law as made by legislatures. This is
not to say that law teachers have been oblivious to the importance of
statutory law in the total legal framework. We teach our students about
statutes-the way in which they are brought into being by the legislative
process, interpreted by the courts, and reconciled with common law.
What we have generally failed to do, however, is to direct our efforts
towards improvement of the law at the legislatures. This unbalanced
approach to law reform is clearly reflected by analyzing the profile of
the direct consumers of our legal scholarship. Who reads our hornbooks,
monographs, and law review articles?4 Practicing lawyers? Certainly.
Judges? Yes, at least when their law clerks or counsel before them cite
these works. Legislators? Almost never. Laymen? Not at all. Who takes
our short courses or attends our special lectures held at the law school
for "outside" audiences? The bar? Yes. The judiciary? Yes. The
legislature? Never. The lay public? So rarely as to be negligible.
The consequence of directing our voices towards the bar and the
bench rather than towards the legislatures has been that the impact of
rational and scholarly thinking upon American law and the usage of
the findings of the social and behavioral sciences have been only
moderate at best. Moreover, improvement in the law has proceeded
slowly and unevenly because judge-made laws must have a litigated case
for a vehicle, and these arise only fortuitously and sometimes take
several years to blossom into an appellate opinion embodying a new
rule.5 Judge-made change in the law, even when it does chance to come
into being, is likely to be a poor substitute for statute law, because the
courts are limited pretty much to the solutions urged by the particular
litigants before them and generally do not create or recognize rights in
the public as such or in persons who are not represented before them;
nor can they impose duties upon nonlitigants or compel the creation
of new social or political institutions. In addition, it is of the very nature
of judge-made law that logic and symmetry are sacrificed at times to
the demand of equity and justice. Moreover, the notion that lawyers
can use social science data and knowledge to win changes in the law
through the litigated case is one that is only just beginning to filter down
through the bar, and one against which settled ways of thinking and
4. It is instructive to note in this connection that even "national" law reviews enjoy only
a piddling circulation: the Yale Law Journal and the Columbia Law Review, for example, boast
a circulation of about 4,000, and the Harvard Law Review, the grandaddy of them all, has only
12,000 subscribers.
5. Of course, the competent lawyer who is fortunate enough to have clients cognizant of
the value of "preventive law" will expend much effort drafting instruments that skirt the pitfalls
of doubtful questions in the law, thus avoiding the risk of resolving them in litigation.
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doing offer stout resistance. Reasoning from logic and precedent is too
deeply engrained in the average lawyer to make much room for the
contribution of scientific data and the completely innovative idea. It is,
for example, simply astounding that we bungled along for decades,
trying to solve the problem of compensation for automobile injuries and
damage through litigation involving the fault notions of tort law, before
Keeton and O'Connell proposed their plan for no-fault insurance
payments. Almost invariably, the only way a comprehensive, rational
legal solution can be devised for any social problem of this breadth is
through legislation; and only by means of legislation can all the social
interests and values that bear on a problem be taken into account and
either harmonized or fitted into a compromise. What is needed is not
so much codification in the sense of restatement of the law, but
codification in the sense of revision, reform, and improvement.
What are the reasons for this neglect of legislative law? Foremost
is the fundamental conception of law that Christopher Columbus
Langdell began building into American legal education a hundred years
ago. He popularized the idea that law is a science in which principles
are discovered through analysis and synthesis of the residue of the legal
process-appellate opinions-just as the basic rules of chemistry are
discovered through the analysis and synthesis of chemical substances.
This idea has been completely displaced today by the recognition that
law is neither science nor magic, but the rational structuring of society
and of relationships between its individual members according to some
compromise among competing values. That a particular compromise
is enshrined in appellate opinions all the way back to the Year Books
is no cause for deeming it more valid than any other. The old conception,
however, has imbued legal scholars, and through them lawyers, with a
reverence for traditional wisdom and thus created an approach to law
revision that is at best timid, and at worst nonexistent.
A second cause is intertwined with the first-the idea that lawyers,
and hence the law, have to do with courts rather than legislatures.
Doubtless, it always has been and probably will continue to be true that
lawyers' day-to-day activities are much more involved with and directed
at the courts than the legislatures; and perhaps legal scholars conceive
of the law as the province of the courts because of the natural inclination
of any teacher to be preoccupied with imparting skills that will best
equip his students for their careers. There is, however, another influence
at work here-the old myth that the judiciary does not make law but
only applies it.6
6. There is some basis for this popular belief. Judges still pay homage to stare decisis, and
they still cannot make law in as sweeping and comprehensive a way as can a legislature. However,
the legal profession is understandably reluctant to publicize the fact that courts, like the legislatures,
do make law, because it seeks to shield the judiciary from politics in the raw.
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Still another cause for the neglect of legislative law is the
preoccupation of legal scholars with the general outlines rather than with
the minute detail of the law. Legal scholars whose specialty is the field
of administrative agencies, for example, have usually emphasized
"administrative law" writ large, rather than the laws, rules, and
procedures governing a particular administrative agency. On the other
hand, anyone who has ever been baptized in the drafting of legislation
knows that it demands attention to the most minute details. In this
connection, it would be interesting and relevant to know how many law
teachers lack any exposure to legislative draftsmanship. A final cause
of the neglect is a fraternal twin of this one-the legal scholar's
preoccupation with the national picture as opposed to the law of any
single state. True, America does share a common law, but that law is
particularized in fifty-odd jurisdictions; so why legal scholars should
content themselves with the fact that at least one jurisdiction has found
the right rule on some problem or that the majority trend is in the right
direction is beyond comprehension. This preoccupation with national
trends, and its resultant neglect of the positive law of any one state, is
encouraged by the mobility of law teachers. With advancement and
prestige often seeming dependent on moving to another school every few
years, and with the so called "terminal" schools bunched together in
a small handful of states, it is no wonder that legal scholars find it
difficult to concentrate any sustained effort on the law of a single state,
and, especially, on the law of those states most desperately in need.
Furthermore, the mystique of the "national" law school so pervades
legal education that everybody strives to attain that image, again to the
detriment of local law.
The upshot of all this is that the statutes of most states are a
confusing, jumbled mass of ad hoc enactments that are badly worded,
lack clarity and consistency, and follow no rationally conceived policy.
Furthermore, there are vast areas of common law, such as the law of
landlord and tenant, that would benefit greatly from comprehensive
statutory revision and codification but that are left to piecemeal
modification by the courts. The question we need to ask ourselves is
this: If the law teaching profession does not begin to mind the store,
who will? The bar is usually far too preoccupied with making a living
to do so, and in many states its organized arm is too shy of financial
resources to muster a permanent effort at law revision and codification.
Legislators typically lack legal expertise, are concerned chiefly with the
politically explosive issues of the moment, and in most states are paid
only on a part-time basis. Legislative staffs suffer from rapid turnover,
low pay and prestige, and generalism. For the most part, they are well
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qualified only in the formalities of bill drafting. Furthermore, the
reference facilities available to them bear not even the faintest
resemblance to a well stocked university library, much less the Library
of Congress. In any event, staff time is spent primarily on projects that
the legislators think will make political hay.
Compare, on the other hand, the resources that a law school can
bring to this task: a diverse group of experts in almost all of the relevant
fields of the law, whose day-to-day activities compel them to think
critically about the law and to keep abreast of the best thinking being
done by others; and an untapped reservoir of energy and talent in
students, who, if directed towards this high calling, would probably do
an extremely creditable job. If a law school could add to these resources
the rest of the modern university-its experts in other disciplines, its
libraries, and its data gathering and storing facilities-what an
incomparable aid to the advancement of the law it could be! What, in
Cardozo's words, a legislature needs, and what a law school together
with its university setting is best equipped to provide, is advice on law
reform that is "expert," "responsible," "disinterested," and
"systematic." Fifty years after his clarion call for a "ministry of
justice," we are still no nearer to having one than we were when his
words were written. Moreover, the writer's four years of experience in
a government bureaucracy leads him to doubt seriously whether a
"ministry of justice" could do the job as well as a law school, because
it would lack a fifth necessary characteristic that Cardozo
overlooked -"independence."
One should not ignore the several bright spots in this dismal picture.
The model and uniform laws promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the model laws
formulated by the American Law Institute are outstanding examples
of the combination of legal scholarship and legislative drafting. These
efforts, however, are inadequate to meet the need of law reform for
several reasons:
(1) Any nationally coordinated endeavor to produce model or
uniform laws is likely to be so unwieldy and time consuming that it
restricts its efforts to a few top-priority areas.
(2) Despite the semantic difference between model and uniform
laws, both have a tendency to pay too much attention to what is thought
to be acceptable to most American legislatures and to the average
lawyer, and thus frequently settle upon the lowest common denominator.
(3) Since the premise underlying a model or uniform law is that
it can be enacted by every state, many needy areas, such as property
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law, are pushed into the background because they are thought to be
too different from state to state to admit of a single law that could
7
accommodate all the variations.
(4) If a particular model or uniform law is not embraced with open
arms by the country's legislatures, often the whole idea is scrapped and
attention focused on other proposals deemed more likely to be enacted.8
(5) Even though they draw their representatives and members from
the various states, the Conference and the Institute lack an effective base
of support in each state to press for adoption of their recommendations.
Consequently, most model and uniform laws get enacted only when
backed by some powerful "lay" interest group for which they possess
strong appeal.'
A second bright spot on the legislative scene is found in those few
states where somebody has begun to mind the store. California, for
example, early fixed upon the idea of a genuine codification of its laws,
and as a result California's Codes come much closer to the ideal of a
rational formulation of whole areas of law than the so-called "codes"
of other states, which are little more than a neat ordering of ad hoc
enactments. Even more importantly, California, as well as other states
not so devoted to the notion of true codification, has followed the lead
of New York in recognizing the need for a permanent watchdog
dedicated to law improvement and has created a law revision
commission. In still other states the bar has shouldered a continuing
responsibility for law revision. The State Bar of Texas, for example,
over the last twenty years, has undertaken the methodical revision, and
codification of a number of areas of Texas law. Its work products, like
those of law revision commissions generally, have been the result of a
7. A notable current proposal that may succeed in disproving this thesis is the Uniform
Probate Code.
8. One victim of this win-lose game, a most unfortunate one in the writer's opinion, was
the model land registration, or Torrens, law. When the Conference's model act made little headway, it was completely abandoned, with little thought given to why it failed and how it might have
been changed to increase its prospects for acceptance. It failed primarily because the model was
premised on the inherently improbable concept that people will voluntarily move their land from
the old title security system to a new one at great cost to themselves, and on the virtually discarded
constitutional-law conception of the inviolability of vested property rights-a conception that
resulted in very cumbersome procedures for registration and very timid provisions for curing title
defects. The result has been that attempts to reform that morass of absurdity and inefficiency
known as the American recording systems have centered on such half-way solutions as title
insurance and marketable title acts.
9. In the case of the UCC, the impetus was provided by the banks and other commercial
establishments handling interstate transactions. Public dissatisfaction with the present probate law
may also foster change if it is of sufficient strength to influence the state bar. This may be the
case with the Uniform Probate Code.
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cooperative endeavor between the practicing bar and the faculties of the
several law schools in the state-a combination that almost always
ensures they will be met with respect by the legislature.
The final comparatively bright spot in the picture is federal law.
Although the average lawyer may decry the complexity of federal
statutes, he cannot deny that in comparison with most state statutes
they are generally better drafted, more internally consistent, and follow
a more rational, if not desirable, policy.' 0 The reason for this superior
condition of federal law lies in three facts: (1) Most areas of federal
law are the province of some governmental department or agency that
has its own legal staff-a staff usually not only of fairly high quality
but also expert and experienced in the law that governs the agency or
with which it deals. One of the jobs of such a staff is to keep the agency's
legal house in order. (2) The federal government has instituted an
elaborate system of checks and approvals that almost always assures
every interested department and agency the opportunity to comment on
proposed new legislation and thus prevents the development of
inconsistencies. The system, of course, is not foolproof and often allows
the governing legislation of different agencies to proceed along divergent
lines of development for no good reason. In any event, it is clear that
similar expertise and checks do not generally grace the scene of state
government. (3) The United States Congress has much more extensive
and expert committee staffs than any state legislature can hope to
possess.
III.

THE LAW'S FORGOTTEN MAN

There has been much talk recently of how the disadvantaged
minorities, the poor, and the people of middle income have been
neglected by the law. For the most part, law that affects these groups
has been comparatively underdeveloped" or invisible, because their
contacts with the law generally are limited to the discretionary justice
of the police, inferior courts of the small claims or magistrate variety,
petty officials administering welfare, and so forth. The wealthy know
they can afford legal counsel and services, so they do not hesitate to
10. This is not to imply that federal law is free from defects and would derive no benefit
from a law revision watchdog. Federal law, however, is almost exemplary when compared with
state law generally.
I1. Part of the neglect is again attributable to the traditional over-concern of legal scholars
for appellate opinions. These sources of law generally involve only those clients wealthy enough
and embody only those issues monetarily important enough to reach all the way up through the
judicial hierarchy to the appellate courts. Thus, law as we were trained to think of it was the
law of the rich.
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seek them; but these others, whose resources at worst are even
insufficient to meet their other needs and at best leave little room for
an emergency, are afraid to darken the door of a lawyer's office even
when they realize they have a legitimate grievance. A concerted effort
appears at last to be underway to meet the need for legal services for
these neglected groups-to provide lawyers at public expense or by
means of private legal insurance (judicare) or group services, to enact
new social legislation, and to establish new protective institutions, such
as human rights commissions and consumer protection offices. This is
all to the good. What has escaped our attention is a neglect that is far
more fundamental. This neglect is ignorance-specifically, ignorance of
and about the law.
Law conceived in its broadest sense is the very structuring of the
society in which people live-the institutional and normative framework
which governs their relations with their fellow citizens. Yet how many
laymen have even the foggiest notion what this framework really is and
how it works, apart from a few vague ideas picked up from a civics
course in high school, a political science course in college, or the Perry
Mason television series? What are the consequences of this ignorance
for these classes of citizens? First of all, the individual does not know
when his rights have been violated and redress can be had. To take only
one example, how many laymen know that the fine print of a form which
tells them they have waived all their rights and which they signed without
reading may be held to be a contract of adhesion and thus worth no
more than the paper it is printed on? A second consequence is that the
individual does not know when to insist on seeing a lawyer, or even when
and how he can protect his rights himself. For example, even assuming
equal bargaining power of the parties, how many laymen realize that
most of the provisions of a contract for buying a house or for leasing
an apartment are required neither by law nor by custom, but are purely
a matter of the bargain? Moreover, who is likely to tell them?12 Surely
not the realtor who is out to consummate the transaction and collect
his fee, and whose organization probably drafted the form in the first
place. A still more serious consequence of this ignorance is that the
great mass of the people-those who control the ballot box and to
12. The remark has been made that the Supreme Court in Miranda had to force the police
to tell a criminal suspect his civil rights because society had failed in its duty to educate the citizenry
of those rights. All this means that both the rectification of injustice and the improvement of the
law that could take place through lawyers and the courts is much more haphazard, sporadic, and
sparse than it would otherwise be.
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whom legislators incline their ears-have scant impact upon the
formation and progress of the law through legislation. Those projects
that hold the greatest promise of social betterment gather dust in the
pages of some law review or on some professor's bookshelf, because
they lack any political booster power behind them. Election campaigns,
instead of concentrating on the merits and demerits of concrete
proposals, degenerate into vague mouthings about law-and-order and
moral leadership, which, like Love, America, and Brotherhood, nobody
can really oppose. Finally, when definite proposals are bruited, like
preventive detention, extended jail sentences, no-knock entries and
searches, and national data banks on political dissenters, the great mass
of the people are apathetic because they have little idea that their basic
13
liberties are at stake.
The point is that if anybody understands the significance of the
grand design of Anglo-American law and its noblest traditions, it is the
law teaching profession, and we have been neglecting to communicate
its message to those who need that message most. This failure to direct
our message to the great lay mass of Americans is understandable, but
not excusable. The hoary myth that the law is a mysterious sanctuary
to which only the high priests are allowed entry still holds sway in our
unconscious, although we consciously admit that it is not nearly as
mysterious as it appears. Yearly, with each beginning law class, we prove
that "laymen" can absorb a good deal of useful knowledge about it
without too much confusion.' 4 It is only when some upstart layman sets
about to fill the need we have so sorely neglected, as Dacey did with
his How to Avoid Probate, that we begin to perceive the extent of our
neglect. It is no answer to say that a little knowledge of the law is a
dangerous thing. Surely it cannot be more dangerous than total
ignorance. Besides, people are not so stupid as to disregard warnings
to consult an expert, at least when they are told the circumstances under
which they should consult one and why this consultation is necessary.
They understand and appreciate advice of this sort. What laymen do
13. For example, when an atrocity like that at Kent State is committed, the people can be
led into thinking that the issue is simply whether the guardsmen fired in self defense. The real
controversy should center around the criminal negligence of an officialdom blind to the flagrant
impropriety of sending men, armed, trained and psychologically conditioned to exterminate an
enemy in battle, to quell a campus disturbance. The outrage is magnified by realizing that the
men are often untried recruits.
14. Doubtless every learned profession has some tendency to guard its secret mysteries from
the eyes of the uninitiated. Maybe Dr. Benjamin Spock's Baby and Child Care would never have
seen the light of day had not the good doctor realized that if parents know nothing about how
to safeguard their children's health, the children certainly will not!

CHALLENGE TO LEGAL EDUCATION

19711

not appreciate is being told to see an expert "whenever they have a legal
problem," because they perceive this as just a blanket advertisement
to come line the experts' pockets.
Finally, the objection cannot be made that laymen would not read
what we have to say. With the advent of the paperback revolution, the
quantity of reading matter consumed annually by the American public
is simply staggering. If one adds to books all the magazines and
newspapers that people subscribe to or buy at newsstands, he would be
compelled to admit that America has now become very much a reading
nation.
So the whole matter boils down to one single question: If law
teachers fail to light the lamp of knowledge of the law for the lay public,
who will dispel the darkness?
IV.

Two

PROPOSALS FOR A RADICAL REORIENTATION

OF

LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP

A. Formulationof Legislation
The first proposal is this: When law teachers undertake a project
of research looking towards publication, they should seek, whenever it
is appropriate, to embody their conclusions in a specific, well-drafted
bill, the enactment of which would bring the law of a particular
jurisdiction into line with the views that they have asserted. Scholarly
publications in the law always seem to end with criticism of existing
law and broad proposals for its reform, but nothing more. Law teachers
apparently think that their duty is done at this point. Presumably, they
contemplate that some court, on the occasion of some yet unborn case,
will retrieve the pearl of wisdom thus ensconced in the pages of a law
review and mount it in the Law's tiara, or that some public-spirited
legislator will grasp the importance of the problem and the worth of
the professor's solution and put his legislative staff to work drafting
the necessary bill. Most of the material in law reviews probably is not
so fortunate and likely is not even read by the professor's colleagues
in other law schools.
What is here being urged, therefore, is that law professors embody
their ideas in legislation-to-be, and that law reviews replace their
emphasis on the traditional scholarly article with one on new proposals
for legislation. A vehicle for actually changing the law would thus be
at hand, and not left to others to improvise. Moreover, by putting the
proposals in specific form, the professor is much more likely to elicit
from the bar constructive criticism, suggestions, and active interest in
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helping to shape a final draft for submission to the legislature. Just as
importantly, law teachers and researchers in other states would have
available the best work of their colaborers elsewhere; Idaho, for
example, could benefit from Wisconsin's thoughtful law reforms. There
are no media presently functioning in which one state's efforts in all
fields of law are regularly communicated to other states.
More than this is needed, however. In states that have no law
revision commission or other body currently minding the store, at least
the law school of the state university, and hopefully the law faculties
of all the law schools in the state, should undertake the law revision
function." In developing proposals, a law faculty should not play
solitaire. Constructive criticism and aid can be obtained from law
students, and from faculty and graduate students in other disciplines.
The typical third-year seminar, for example, could be restructured.
Instead of being spent on the preparation and discussion of a plethora
of topics-in one broad field of law, culminating in a paper on each topic
by one student in the model of a scholarly law review note or comment,
the seminar could be arranged around one or a limited number of topics.
The objective would be to concentrate research, thought, and
draftsmanship on a single group product-the proposed legislation. This
approach has been tried at the University of New Mexico Law School
in a course entitled "Legislation." The topic chosen was the problem
of implied consent to blood tests for DWI's, but the same approach
could be taken in most seminars in special fields of interest.
Interdisciplinary seminars would prove particularly beneficial in this
format because the ideas of social and behavioral scientists derived from
knowledge accumulated in their fields would have greater likelihood of
being translated into law. In short, why don't we law professors stop
talking about social engineering and start doing something about it?
Law is to the social and behavioral sciences what engineering is to the
physical sciences and medicine to the biological sciences; it is not the
queen of the social sciences or even a science in itself, but the means
for putting to use for the benefit of humanity the knowledge and insights
uncovered by other disciplines.
Is such a broadly based mobilization geared towards law reform
inconsistent with, or at any rate something of a diversion from, the
central purpose of a law school-the training of young men and women
15. Although existing commissions have typically limited their efforts to nonpolitical areas
of law, no sound reason exists for a law faculty so to limit itself. For a discussion of the problems
that faculty involvement in the presentation of politically controversial legislation may pose see
pp. 947-51 infra.
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for careers in law? The answer, quite simply, is no. On the contrary,
its educational benefits would be significant. The writer has always had
serious doubts about how much good it does to hammer the average
law student into the mold of a law review scholar, and that seems to
be exactly what we are doing in the typical seminar. The sort of workproduct we are compelling all students to produce is one that involves
skills used only in writing appellate briefs-a very small part of the
average lawyer's practice-or legal memoranda for the senior partners
in a large law firm. How many of our students are likely to be involved
in these tasks from day to day? On the other hand, drafting legislation
inculcates skills that are widely needed and used almost daily in every
law practice. Precision, clarity, and conciseness of language and
organization of material should reach their apex in the drafting of both
legislation and private legal instruments. In addition, a seminar directed
at producing a bill can involve the students in learning the important
skill of negotiation and acquiring a good sense for distinguishing
between what is expendable in a proposal and what, on principle, cannot
be compromised. Moreover, legal research is not necessarily neglected,
because draft legislation should be supported by back-up papers that
reflect research as extensive and vigorous as the most scholarly law
review article or note. Last but not least, this emphasis on reform of
the law through legislation hopefully would instill in each new crop of
fledgling lawyers a sense of the ongoing responsibility of the bar for
the quality of the law itself, and not just for achieving justice in the
individual case.
Once a bill has been formulated, the drafters have the responsibility
to place their recommendations before the legislature. A special
mechanism within the law school for accomplishing this end would
greatly facilitate matters. A few years ago the University of New Mexico
Law School established this kind of an organizational arm-the
Institute of Public Law and Services-with a full-time salaried
Director. 6 The purpose was to obtain contracts with and grants from
state and local governments and state agencies, and to coordinate and
carry out the desired research. The Institute, however, ended up more
or less like the proverbial old maid waiting for Prince Charming to show
up. Few grants and contracts were forthcoming, and the Director
evolved into an assistant to the Dean on general law school matters.
16. The director of this kind of institute must be carefully chosen. He should be sincerely
involved in law reform while still maintaining good rapport with the state bar and the legislature.
This job is no idle sinecure for the comfortably retired judge, practitioner, or civil servant, because
it will entail detailed and often tedious work in the formulation of specific legislative proposals.
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The cause of this denouement was the failure to recognize that such an
institute, in order to generate demands upon itself, must first prove its
usefulness; and this it can do only if it takes the initiative and carries
out some projects of law research and reform on its own. The law
faculty, therefore, should do just that and utilize the organizational arm
to coordinate its efforts and to act as a liaison with the state bar and
with the legislature. Although due consideration should be given to all
suggestions, criticisms and comments coming from the state bar or from
other sources outside the law school, the law faculty should not
relinquish its independence by turning over its proposals to other groups,
but should continue to seek the adoption of proposals that these groups
oppose or want to modify. This independence must be retained to avoid
good ideas being watered down or eviscerated by special interests.17
A prototype of sustained active interest and labor of the sort here
being advocated is Columbia Law School's Legislative Drafting
Research. Fund,1 which was founded in 1911 by the late Professor
Joseph P. Chamberlain. The Fund over its lifetime has done extremely
important work, ranging from New York's first unemployment
insurance law and New York's health code to, in more recent years, a
model state constitution and a model alcoholism treatment act., 9 Under
the Fund's auspices, a plan on much the same order as the KeetonO'Connell no-fault insurance plan was devised a full generation before
the latter. In many ways, this institution is one of the most significant
yet little heralded organizations in the history of American legal
education, and demonstrates what can be done when law schools put
their shoulders to the law reform plow. It has operated on a slightly
different basis than this paper is suggesting: it provides only expert
backup services and relies on outside organizations to do the legwork
of pushing the reforms through. Although it has on occasion gone out
and found a sponsor for some piece of legislation for which there was
17. While law faculties are usually immune to the charge that they have an axe to grind,
lawyers, in general, are not. The bar, for example, has not adequately supported probate law reform
because it enjoys profits from this cumbersome relic of Bleak House. The same is probably true
of the Keeton-O'Connell insurance plan.
18. The Yale University School of Law has established a similar program. Yale Legislative
Services is a voluntary service organization composed primarily of members of Yale Law School.
The main objectives of YLS are to provide a wide range of legislative services, in the nature of
nonpartisan analysis, study, and research, to legislative and other governmental bodies, and to
provide students with an educational experience concerning the legislative process. The YLS has
been an invaluable aid to many state legislatures, especially the Connecticut General Assembly.
Several notable projects by the Service include work on reapportionment, environmental law, and
black capitalism.
19. It has also done yeoman service in the fields of housing law enforcement and pollution
control legislation.
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a pressing need, its principal role has been to equip others to be effective
advocates of reform. This is doubtless the ideal modus operandi, but
what may work for New York-a state that abounds in private do-good
organizations of all kinds-may not be so feasible in states where there
is a dearth of these activist groups. In the latter states, a law school
may have to assume much of the burden of advocacy itself.
In implementing these proposals, any university and any law faculty
must bear in mind that there is a difference between an honest and
reasonable effort to get one's ideas and proposals fairly aired and a
dogged determination to ram them down others' throats. The former
we can defend as being consistent with our rather privileged position
in society; the latter we cannot. Unfortunately, it is hard to gauge where
the one ends and the other begins. All that can be done here is to flash
a warning beacon, because it is impossible to set any hard and fast rules.
For example, if a proposal is made and adequately explained to the
legislature, but is rejected, the New York Law Revision Commission
apparently follows the rule of thumb that that proposal, or at least its
offending features, must be jettisoned. This approach seems unduly
restrictive. If the scholar who made the proposal is convinced that the
legislature's action. represents a sacrifice of the general public's interest
to that of a special interest group, unjustly discriminates against a
minority group, or is seriously detrimental to the welfare of the body
politic, he would be remiss in his duty if he did not call this to the
attention of the final arbiter on all questions of what the law ought to
be-the voting public. In these situations, however, criticism of
legislative action should be limited to the scholar's area of expertise;
those criticisms that derive purely from his own disagreement with the
legislature's assessment of the relative importance of values about which
reasonable men may differ ought to be excluded. He can as a citizen
put forward the latter type of criticism, but should not look to his
university to facilitate it.
B.

Law for the Layman

The other reorientation of legal scholarship here proposed is writing
about law for the layman so that he can fulfill his public duties and
protect his own rights and interests as a human being. What is needed
are serious efforts by legal scholars to bring the law down to a layman's
level, not do-it-yourself kits like Dacey's How to A void Probate.Some
of this sort of writing has been done by lawyers, and occasionally it
has been rather good. The individual lawyer's product, however, must
be nationwide in coverage in order to get published in a national book
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market and consequently often fails to give adequate guidance about
important local variations in the law. What is really highly useful is
something on the order of a little book published a short while ago by
a committee of the State Bar of Texas-How to Live and Die with Texas
Probate. It is a superb example of useful writing about the law for
laymen, which gives quite full and adequate information about the law
and procedures governing wealth transmission at death. From it a
reasonably intelligent layman could easily determine whether he needs
20
a will and whether he also needs full-fledged estate planning.
Books on legal subjects that most laymen are interested in are not
the only sort of writing needed. To penetrate deeper into the fabric of
society, scholarly writing about the law for laymen must use media other
than books. Since the typical bookreader is the person with aboveaverage education, legal writing for magazines and newspapers may be
the only way to reach great mass of people. Law teachers should also
participate in televised public discussion forums on legal matters of great
current interest. 21 Surely, if law professors had been willing to shoulder
more of their responsibility for explaining to the lay public what the
Supreme Court was doing in extending Bill of Rights protections to state
criminal proceedings, the politicians' demands for impeachment of some
Supreme Court justices or for packing the Court with "strict
constructionists" would have fallen on much less sympathetic ears.
Another good example comes from the writer's own bailiwick-property
law. He has long been convinced that the home buying public is being
milked annually of millions of dollars to support the flock of abstractors
and title insurance companies that have battened themselves on the
American deed records system. This incubus could be shed by shifting
to a title registration, or Torrens, system. The rub comes when one asks
how the legislature is going to be convinced to make the shift. The only
people who really understand how absurdly inefficient and expensive the
present system is are none other than the parasites themselves! Unless
one expects a man to be altruistic enough to champion a proposal that
would render him superfluous, it is futile to address one's arguments
for change to these persons. It would appear that the only way to build
support for the switch would be to address oneself directly to the very
20. The book does have several drawbacks: it is multi-authored and consequently somewhat
uneven in quality, and the writing tends to be duller than the subject demands. Law professors
should be able to turn out a much more readable product.
21. Another project worth trying is short courses on law for laymen on educational television
stations. These stations are often affiliated with universities, and consequently get much of their
programming from local sources. Courses in philosophy and other liberal arts subjects are
frequently televised, and short courses on law for laymen would make welcome additions.
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people who are now paying for the present system-the home buying
public. This can probably only be done through the mass
media-newspapers and television.
V.

POSSIBLE

DEPARTURES

FROM

THE

PRINCIPLE

OF

ACADEMIC

NEUTRALITY

There is no doubt that the community involvement of legal scholars
here called for could provoke a storm of controversy. The involvement,
however, is imperative. If American liberties go down the drain, as they
came perilously close to doing in the early 1950's and seem about to
do again today, and if America continues to be saddled with an
outmoded system of law, we law professors will have nobody to blame
but ourselves. Is there, then, a rationale by which this involvement can
be squared with the traditional principles of academic freedom? The
writer believes there is. Of course, no rationale can guarantee our
freedom and security from attack by irate special-interest groups or their
minions in legislatures and in seats of executive power. All such a
rationale can do is give us assurance that if we do fall victim to their
wrath, we "perish" with a clear conscience and in the knowledge that
we have not compromised the basic principles on which our
independence, like that of all university scholars, rests.
A.

Academic Neutralityfor the Law Teacher

What does neutrality mean? It means that the institution-the
university-must remain uncommitted to any particular idea, proposal,
or viewpoint; it has never meant that the individual scholar should
remain uncommitted. His obligation is only to follow wherever his
values, his reason, and his research lead him. He owes an obligation
to ferret out all the relevant knowledge and thinking on a subject before
he takes a position. He owes an obligation to act with scholarly
moderation and responsibility, bearing in mind his own fallibility and
appreciating that there are almost always two reasonable sides to every
question. He also owes an obligation not to let his judgment be swayed
by strictly partisan considerations or by some special interest group of
which he is a member. Having given all these obligations their due,
however, he must follow the best lights he has and advocate whatever
ideas, proposals, or viewpoints that he has come to in the course of his
immersion in the subject field, no matter how controversial they may
be. Thus, if the biologist is convinced that the Darwinian theory of
evolution best explains the scientific data before him, he should not avoid
propagating that theory because his board of regents or state legislature
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finds it repugnant. Law professors likewise need not and must not avoid
propagating their views. Indeed, they have never been reticent in
speaking to their own fraternity, which includes lawyers and judges. Law
professors, however, have confined their critical commentary on the law
for the most part to their students and their confreres in the legal
profession. The biologist may have no obligation to propagate his ideas
outside his own discipline; the advancement of biology may depend on
nothing more than the spread of new findings and ideas within the
limited circle of the experts themselves. Can the same thing, however,
be said of the law? Doesn't its advancement depend heavily on persons
outside the legal profession-on legislators, administrators, and the
general public? Moreover, how can we justify leaving the public in
massive ignorance of the stuff that forms the very warp and woof of
its communal life, at the city, state and national levels, and even the
22
international level?
B.

A cademic Neutralityfor the Institution

Even if it is conceded that the principle of academic freedom as
applied to the individual scholar is not breached by these proposals, there
remains the problem of institutional neutrality. Universities, by
supporting law reviews with an obviously legislative slant in contrast
to their traditional judicial and scholarly ones, may appear already to
have violated the Plimsoll line. Moreover, it is plain that universities
will have to grant credit in tenure, promotion, and salary decisions to
law professors' work of the sort just described, because the drafting of
legislation is probably the most time consuming legal writing
imaginable. Similarly, the writing of books, articles, and pamphlets of
the law-for-laymen variety is bound to make heavy inroads on a faculty
member's more "scholarly" production. Finally, will not the institution
assume a patently activist stance if it sets up or uses an Institute of
Public Law and Services or other organizational arm to coordinate and
facilitate the translation into positive law of its scholar's proposals for
reform and innovation? These issues are the heart of the problem, and
the answers are by no means obvious.
Many members of the academic community today argue that
universities not only may, but should, take formal positions on political
issues because educational institutions have never been neutral or valuefree. Consequently, failure to take a stand in itself amounts to support
22. Perhaps the principle of academic freedom has held its ground fairly well in America
during this century because the political forces realize that the most noxious idea can be safely
ignored if its propagation is limited to a closed circle.
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of the Government's current political policies and of the Establishment
in general. Others have urged, equally vociferously, that the academic
freedom of the individual scholar was won in return for institutional
neutrality and that to discard neutrality would only invite efforts by
forces outside the university to appoint faculty members more
sympathetic to their positions and to intimidate the unsympathetic ones.
In rebuttal, the advocates of non-neutrality dismiss the idea of academic
freedom as a myth, calling it nothing more than the right to continue
to say and do things the way they have always been said and done.
Although scholars who spout traditional ideas may appear not to utilize
their academic freedom, full academic freedom is still a necessary
atmosphere if there is to be any original thought. Moreover, the
arguments that institutional neutrality is essential for the maintenance
of academic freedom seem irrefutable.
The writer would argue that the proposals advanced in this article
are consistent with the notion of institutional neutrality. This argument
is bottomed on the fact that the institution itself does not dictate its
scholars' proposals; indeed, even the law faculty as a body does not.
Assuming that a professor's proposal meets the requisite qualitative
standards, the institution must give it the same respect accorded all
others that meet those same standards, regardless of the individual
values it reflects?3 The situation can be analogized to that of the
university press. Most universities supply publication facilities to
disseminate knowledge and ideas produced by the ferment of academic
research, thought, and discussion, but university ownership of the press
does not imply institutional endorsement of any published ideas.
The battle to keep facilitation distinct from endorsement was
refought only two years ago at the University of New Mexico. The
University had for many years published a learned journal-the New
Mexico Quarterly-that cut across all university disciplines. A double
number was scheduled to be devoted to an anthology of creative
literature representative of current trends in America. After the issue
had been assembled completely, carefully edited by not one, but two,
professors of English, printed, and even distributed to foreign
subscribers, the University administration learned to its chagrin that one
23. There can be no institutionally-nurtured orthodoxy, either of the radical left, the rigid
right, or the fence-sitting middle. Particular attention must be called to the necessity that law
faculties, like other scholarly groups, guard against philosophical inbreeding. There is a natural
human tendency, in viewing potential candidates for faculty openings, to regard as superior the
one who parrots our own views and positions. If this tendency is indulged, we conclude by
surrounding ourselves with those who agree with us, and our illusions of infallibility are fed by

this environment.
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of the included poems juxtaposed the word "cunt" and an allusion to
Christ! After a hurried consultation with the regents, the decision was
made to impound under lock and key the yet undistributed issues
destined for the domestic market. Only after a dogged effort by the
Faculty Policy Committee and a letter from the prestigious South
American literary journal Sur lauding the issue and requesting
permission to reprint it in Spanish, were the regents and administration
persuaded to release the domestic issues. The arguments that carried
the day were: that the offending poem was representative of current
American creative writing; that the University could not suppress it
without appearing to impose thought, or at least speech, control on the
academic community; 24 and that its appearance in a University
publication did not and could not reasonably be taken to constitute
University endorsement of whatever the poem was meant to say.
No doubt there is a difference between publishing- a poem and
propagating a proposal for legislative change in the law.2 The writer
is frankly unable to resolve this dilemma in his own mind. Perhaps a
line can be drawn between true lobbying and merely calling the attention
of the legislature or the public to the law reforms one is urging and
the reasons why they ought to be effectuated. In any event, it is
reasonably clear that the difference between what this paper is
advocating that law faculties do and what they have done for decades
in the realm of the common law is only one of degree, and not of kind.
The question that we must keep asking ourselves is this: In view of the
great need, can we justify continuing to make a distinction, that we
cannot logically defend between these types of activities? Should we not
rather embrace legislative activity as well and throw down the gauntlet
to those who would seek to confine us to our more traditional roles?
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the writer is convinced that if law faculties were to
shoulder in a nonpartisan and genuinely helpful spirit the burden, as
herein outlined, the worth of their aid would be quickly recognized by
legislatures, and most of the conceivable adverse consequences would
turn out to be no more than figments of an overly fearful imagination.
24. The poem was not authored by anyone at the University, so the argument that
suppression would violate our academic freedom was not as easy to establish as it might otherwise
have been.
25. Even the Internal Revenue Service recognizes a difference; the publication of a poem
would not endanger an institution's tax-exempt status, but the propogation of a legislative proposal
might do so.

1971]

CHALLENGE TO LEGAL EDUCATION

951

Moreover, by subjecting our ideas to the batterings and bruisings of the
outside world, our teaching and writing might benefit overall by being
brought down from ivory tower to terra firma. The practicing lawyer is
daily subjected to this humbling contact with the reality of vigorous
opposition. How often are We law professors? Finally, but most importantly, the pace of advance of American law towards its ancient
goal of "liberty and justice for all" would be immeasurably quickened.

